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The EU is at risk of violating its international obligations if
efforts to reform the Common Fisheries Policy prove
unsuccessful.
by Blog Admin
Recent months have seen renewed efforts to reform the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy.
Alexander Proelss assesses the EU’s track record, noting that 81 per cent of European fish
stocks are currently overfished by the EU’s own estimates, and that this figure may be even
higher depending on the measurement used. A number of different obstacles will need to be
overcome if the reform efforts are to be successful, not least finding a way around the
significant political opposition within Member States to any reduction in fishing quotas.
According to the European Union’s 2009 green paper on the ref orm of  the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP), 81 per cent of  European f ish stocks are overf ished. Some scientists argue that
even this prediction is clearly underestimating the actual state of  European f ish stocks. Based on the
notion that a f ish stock is overf ished if  its biomass is too small to produce maximum sustainable yield
(MSY), it has been argued that under a “business as usual” scenario, 91 per cent of  European f ish stocks
will f ail to meet the goal of  the Johannesburg Plan of  Implementation –  according to which f ish stocks are
to be maintained at or restored to “levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield with the aim of
achieving these goals f or depleted stocks on an urgent basis and where possible not later than 2015”.
While these f igures are subject to a certain degree of  controversy, as no suf f iciently specif ic legal
def init ions exist of  what MSY and “overf ished” mean quantitatively, they demonstrate that lit t le progress
has been made in achieving the f undamental ref orms necessary f or a sustainable f isheries sector in
Europe.
There are several reasons f or the f ailure of
the CFP, which range f rom biological,
economical and legal f actors, to polit ical
shortcomings. An ideal f isheries policy would
f oster the sustainable use of  f ish stocks,
provide f or coherent laws and regulations
that yield adequate economic incentives, and
guarantee consistent enf orcement of  the
legal f ramework. Even though it is undeniable
that some progress has been achieved
concerning the restoration of  certain f ish
stocks, none of  these requirements has been
f ully met by the CFP as it stands today.
Against this background, current attempts to
ref orm the CFP will not only determine
whether Europe will be capable of  preserving
and sustainably managing a f inite natural resource, but will also af f ect the economic survival of  the
European f isheries industry.
From a governance perspective, the polit ical challenges involved in the matter are particularly relevant due
to the f act that the conservation of  marine biological resources under the CFP is one of  the very f ew areas
with regard to which the European Union (EU) exercises exclusive competence. The public disgrace
attached to the potential f ailure to implement the necessary ref orms will hopef ully provide an incentive f or
the EU’s institutions to agree on the required measures.
At the meeting of  the Council on 28 January 2013, the Fisheries Ministers of  the EU Member States
stressed the need to reach a polit ical agreement on the CFP ref orm bef ore mid-2013. Taking into account
the imminent plenary vote of  the European Parliament on the f irst reading of  the proposals submitted by
the Commission (of  July 2011) and the Council (general approach of  June 2012), the question arises as to
what aspects of  the CFP are in need of  urgent ref orm. Leaving aside the debate on the f uture
subsidisation of  the CFP by way of  establishing a new f und f or the EUʼs marit ime and f isheries policies, the
duty to implement MSY (accompanied by the need f or a general ban on discards, the ef f ective enf orcement
of  European f isheries law and the resolution of  conf licts with the requirements of  European nature
conservation law) constitutes the central element of  a truly sustainable CFP. Correspondingly, the
Commission has stated that “long-term sustainable environmental conditions… are a prerequisite to reach
an economically and socially sustainable f ishing industry that contributes to the availability of  f ood”.
Contrary to what is of ten stated, the duty to maintain and restore European f ish stocks to levels capable
of  producing MSY has been a legal obligation under public international law since the entry into f orce of  the
United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS), to which the EU acceded in 1998. Article 2 of
the Commission draf t f or the new Basic Regulation of  the CFP now expressly emphasises and reinf orces
this international obligation by setting a f inal deadline of  2015, but its wording dif f ers f rom that of  the
corresponding international legal obligations contained in the LOS Convention and the United Nations Fish
Stocks Agreement (UNFSA). It is a matter of  debate as to whether the phrase “shall aim to ensure, by 2015,
that exploitation of  living marine biological resources restores and maintains populations of  harvested
species above levels which can produce the MSY” ought to be interpreted in a way under which the ‘f ishing
mortality’ and not the ‘stock biomass’ constitutes the crucial parameter of  f isheries management. If  this
question is answered in the af f irmative, the EU is at risk of  violating its international obligations, which
arguably ref er to the stock biomass as the decisive criterion. The general approach of  the Council on the
one hand deserves approval f or strengthening the MSY commitment by inserting the words “at least at
levels which can produce MSY” (as does the recent outcome document of  the Rio+20 summit), but must be
crit icised on the other f or weakening the deadline by accepting that the duty to manage and restore f ish
stocks to MSY-producing levels shall be complied with until 2015 only “where possible” and f or all stocks
until 2020 “at the latest”. Thus, insisting on the internationally accepted def init ion of  MSY as well as on the
f inal deadline of  2015 would be a strong polit ical message in f avour of  sustainability on the part of  the
European Parliament.
The commitment to MSY should not obstruct the view on the f act that the concept of  MSY accepts that
even though stock biomass ought to be considered as the crucial parameter, other f actors such as f ishing
patterns, the interdependence of  stocks, economic needs of  coastal f ishing communities and social
requirements can be taken into account. This can lawf ully lead to economic and social objectives being
given a higher weighting than environmental objectives depending on the individual circumstances. With that
said, the scope of  discretion of  the EU is not unlimited. Repeated disregard f or biomass development and
other environmental f actors cannot be held to be in accordance with the UNCLOS and the precautionary
principle as a binding rule of  European law. In order to saf eguard that the management measures set by the
EU do not signif icantly or repeatedly exceed levels that would allow overf ished stocks to recover, or f or
stocks to be maintained at a level that can produce MSY respectively, the scope of  discretion of  the EU
institutions in reaching MSY should be limited in the proposed Basic Regulation by the duty to impose
saf ety margins that increase with the degree of  scientif ic uncertainty on the status of  the f ish stocks
concerned. As f ar as multiannual plans are concerned, such a limitation could be included in Article 9 (4) of
the draf t Basic Regulation.
Having said all this, the f uture of  the CFP does not only depend on the implementation of  the ref orm
process itself . Rather, the f act that the EU is bound to the obligation to measure f ish stocks at MSY-
producing levels must imply that the Union can be held accountable f or potential f ailures to implement the
necessary measures. While according to Article 263 TFEU, the European Court of  Justice (ECJ) is generally
empowered to review the legality of  acts of  the European institutions, the polit icised nature of  f isheries
and the economic interests at stake make it highly unlikely that an EU institution will challenge the acts of
another institution in a way that would cause social and economic impacts in the Member States. Due to the
collective allotment of  f isheries quotas under the auspices of  “relative stability”, it is equally unlikely that an
individual Member State would take up an action to reduce ‘total allowable catches’ as this would not only
impact on its own f ishing quota, but would also reduce the quotas of  the other Member States at the same
time. The ECJ has also applied the procedural requirements governing legal standing of  natural or legal
persons in an unjustif iably strict manner. The necessary degree of  legal control of  the f uture CFP can thus
only be saf eguarded by way of  providing extended access of  natural and legal persons (such as NGOs) to
the ECJ. In terms of  law, leaving signif icant legal breaches (such as violations of  the duty to manage f ish
stocks at MSY) potentially unaddressed, would arguably neither be compatible with the principle of  the rule
of  law as embodied in Articles 2 and 19 (2) of  the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), nor with the Aarhus
Convention on Access to Inf ormation, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, to which the EU is a party since 2005. Time will tell whether the institutions of  the
EU will be willing to address and ef f ectively implement their obligations under international and their own
(European) law.
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